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Comments
A New Standard for Evaluating Conglomerate Joint
Ventures Under Clayton Act Section 7 and a New
Formula for the Potential-Competition
Doctrine
The legality of conglomerate joint ventures' under the antitrust
laws2 has presented perplexing problems for the courts. Joint ventures
3
can both enhance and stifle competition in a given market. In general,
the same standards used to analyze conglomerate merger 4 cases also
have been applied to conglomerate joint ventures. 5 The United States
I. A conglomerate joint venture is an agreement by companies to produce a product
when the companies did not previously produce the same product in the same geographical
market and when there was no buy-sell relation between them. Brodley, The Legal Status of
Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: A Summary Assessment, 21 ANTITRUST BULL. 453,
471 (1976); see 16B J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, ANTITRUST LAWS AND
TRADE REGULATION § 17.07 (1981).
2. The Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (Supp. IV 1980) (amending the Clayton Act
§ 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)), provides in part: "No person engaged in commerce or in any
activity affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
stock or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also
in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any
activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
3. For purposes of this Comment, a joint venture is a joint business undertaking to
carry out a particular objective pursuant to an agreement that provides for joint contribu-
tions of capital, sharing of profits or production in kind, and a mutual right to control the
operations of the venture. This definition was drawn from two sources: In re Atlantic Rich-
field Co., F.T.C. No. 9089, slip op. (Feb. 15, 1979); Bernstein, Joint Ventures in the Light of
Recent Antitrust Developments: Anti-Competitive Joint Ventures, 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 25, 25
n.27 (1965). A joint venture has also been defined as "an association of two or more natural
or juridical persons to carry on as co-owners an enterprise, venture, or operation for the
duration of that particular transaction or series of transactions or for a limited time." Taub-
man, What Constitutes a Joint Venture?, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 640, 641 (1956).
4. A merger is "a permanent union of previously separate enterprises" that eliminates
competition between the merged entities. A merger is characterized by the replacement of
two independent decisionmaking institutions with a single unified system of control. P.
AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 835-53 (3d ed. 1981). A conglomerate merger is an acquisi-
tion that is neither horizontal nor vertical. It involves entry into either new geographic mar-
kets or new product lines. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
78 HARV. L. REv. 1313, 1315 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Turner].
5. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964). In Penn-Olin, the
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Supreme Court has evaluated the legality of conglomerate mergers and
conglomerate joint ventures by focusing on market concentration.6
Under the potential-competition doctrine,7 acquisitions will be found
to violate the Clayton Act8 when they create a new business entity that
will substantially lessen competition in a market by removing a poten-
tial competitor 9 or by increasing future market concentration. 0 The
doctrine was applied to a joint venture arrangement in 1964 in United
States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co. II Later Supreme Court and lower
court cases have modified and refined the doctrine in conglomerate
Court, although recognizing that a merger eliminates a competitor, whereas a joint venture
creates one, stated: "Overall, the same considerations apply to joint ventures as to mergers,
for in each instance we are but expounding a national policy enunciated by the Congress to
preserve and promote a free competitive economy." Id at 170. Later, the Court explained:
"Just as a merger eliminates actual competition, this joint venture may well foreclose any
prospect of competition ... " Id at 173 (emphasis added). See also Yamaha Motor Co. v.
FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981);
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (apply-
ing potential-competition doctrine although the distinction between mergers and joint ven-
tures is acknowledged); Bernstein, Joint Ventures in the Light of Recent Antitrust
Developments.- Anti-Competitive Joint Ventures, 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 25, 25 (1965); Com-
ment, The Corporate Joint Venture Under the Antitrust Laws, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 712 (1962)
(pre-Penn-Olin Comment advocating application of merger standards to joint ventures).
6. Market concentration reflects the degree to which an industry or market is con-
trolled by a small number of leading producers. J. BLAIR, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION 2
(1972). Professors Areeda and Turner have made the following analysis of the relationship
between concentration ratios and competition: "[B]eyond some point the smaller the
number of firms and the larger the share of the market occupied by one or a relatively few
firms, the greater the likelihood of substantial departures from competitive performance,
particularly with regard to price. As the level of concentration increases past some point, the
more likely it is that the leading firms will recognize the interdependence of their respective
price decisions and refrain from reducing their respective prices to competitive levels." IV
P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 55 (1980).
The Supreme Court in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), charac-
terized a concentrated industry as one in which there is domination in manufacture and sale
by a few leaders, there is foreclosure of business, and there are high barriers to entry facing
prospective competitors. See id at 322. For economic analyses, see L. PRESTON, THE IN-
DUSTRY & ENTERPRISE STRUCTURE OF THE U.S. ECONOMY 6-18 (1971); F. SCHERER, IN-
DUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE & ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 287-95, 355-57 (2d ed. 1980).
7. The earliest Supreme Court decisions that express concern about the probable fu-
ture effects of an acquisition and that provide the first pronouncements of potential-competi-
tion theory are United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v.
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294 (1962). For an analysis of the distinctions between perceived potential entry and actual
potential entry, see text accompanying notes 58-60 infra.
8. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (Supp. IV 1980) (amending Clayton Act § 7, 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1976)).
9. Justice Marshall described three types of potential competitors in United States v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 558-62 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring). See text
accompanying notes 57-60 infra.
10. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 623-25 (1974).
11. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
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merger and conglomerate joint venture cases.12
An analysis ofjoint ventures in the offshore crude oil market, how-
ever, demonstrates that conglomerate joint ventures often function dif-
ferently from conglomerate mergers.13 Consequently, their legality
under the antitrust laws should be judged by different standards. This
Comment examines the evolution of the potential-competition doctrine
and applies the doctrine to joint ventures in the oil industry. The Com-
ment argues that use of the same standard in all cases fails to distin-
guish between mergers and joint ventures,' 4 and that the potential-
competition doctrine as currently formulated is not appropriate to an
analysis of the legality of joint ventures either in the oil industry or in
other high technology, high risk, capital-intensive industries.15 Finally,
the Comment proposes a new, distinct standard for determining the
legality of joint ventures. This standard incorporates and balances the
risk factors involved in the business undertaking, the capital require-
ments of the endeavor, the effects of foreign competition, and the likeli-
hood that technological advancement or other benefits will result from
the venture.
Legislative and Judicial Antecedents of the Potential-
Competition Doctrine
Section 7 of the Clayton Act,' 6 adopted by Congress in 1914, was
designed to prohibit horizontal acquisition agreements' 7 that would
12. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v. Fal-
staff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568
(1967); Yamaha Motor Co., v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981); Mercantile Texas Corp. v.
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 638 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1981); FTC v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977).
13. This portion of the analysis will focus on some of the antitrust problems presented
in the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) lawsuit against the eight largest United States pe-
troleum-producing companies. In re Exxon Corp., F.T.C. No. 8934, [1973-1976 Transfer
Binder, Complaints & Orders] TRADE REG. REp. (CCH) 20,388 (filed July 17, 1973, dis-
missed September 16, 1981).
14. See notes 3-4 supra.
15. See Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, 87 YALE
L.J. 1 (1977) (criticizing potential-competition doctrine) [hereinafter cited as Brodley]; Pitof-
sky, Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reections on the Signfftcance of Penn-
Olin, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1007 (1969) (same) [hereinafter cited as Pitofsky]; Posner, Antitrust
Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger
and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 282 (1975) (same). See generaly
Brodley, Joint Ventures and,4ntitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1523 (1982) (proposing an
alternative method of evaluating the legality of joint venture arrangements).
16. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(Supp. IV 1980)).
17. That is, an acquisition by one firm of the stock or assets of another, where the
second firm produces an identical product or a close substitute and sells it in the same geo-
graphic market. Turner, supra note 4, at 1315.
July 19821
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lessen competition between sellers competing in the same markets. ' 8 In
response to an increase in concentration in American industry in the
1940's, Congress in 1950 amended section 7 of the Act, 19 extending its
application to acquisitions that are vertical20 and conglomerate2 in ad-
dition to those that are horizontal.
22
The new language contained in section 7 required an analysis of
the effect of an acquisition of either stock or assets on firms that com-
pete in the same geographic and product markets, businesses that have
a buy-sell relationship with one another, and producers that manufac-
ture different goods or that are located in different geographic markets,
but that are affected by the acquisition.23 The amendments were
designed to prevent monopolistic conduct at its incipiency.
24
Section 7 did not provide any specific guidelines to aid courts in
18. The Act was aimed specifically at curbing the development of holding companies
and the use of secret stock purchases. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 314
(1962). One purpose of the Act, as described by Judge Learned Hand, was to "perpetuate
and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in
small units which can effectively compete with each other." United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
19. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950); see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962).
20. A vertical acquisition agreement involves an acquisition of the stock or assets of a
firm that buys the product sold by the acquirer, or sells a product bought by the acquirer.
Turner, supra note 4, at 1315.
21. A conglomerate acquisition agreement is neither horizontal nor vertical; it involves
entry into either new geographic markets or new product lines. See Brodley, The Legal
Status of Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: A Summary Assessment, 21 ANTITRUST
BULL. 453, 471 (1976) (conglomerate joint ventures); Turner, supra note 4, at 1315 (conglom-
erate mergers).
22. This amendment reflected a conclusion by Congress that asset acquisitions, as well
as stock purchases, had serious anticompetitive effects. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. 2, reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4293, 4294.
Prior to the 1950 amendment, the Sherman Act § I (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1976)) had been used by the government to challenge horizontal and vertical mergers and
horizontal and vertical joint ventures. Section 1 declares that every contract, combination,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the states is illegal. Combinations
that amounted to joint ventures were challenged under § I of the Sherman Act in Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S.
344 (1933); Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931). Violations of
§ 2 of the Sherman Act (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976)) were claimed in United
States v. Paramount Pictures, 344 U.S. 131 (1948); Lee Line Steamers v. Memphis, H.&R.
Packet Co., 277 F. 5 (6th Cir. 1922). Conglomerate mergers and conglomerate joint ven-
tures, however, had been practically unaffected by the pre-1950 antitrust laws. See Turner,
supra note 4, at 1314.
23. H.R. REP. No. 1911, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949): "[The amended § 7 applies] to
all types of mergers and acquisitions, vertical and conglomerate as well as horizontal, which
have the specified effects of substantially lessening competition . . . or tending to create a
monopoly."
24. The Supreme Court called the 1950 amendment to the Clayton Act a "more strin-
gent standard than the Sherman Act" because incipient as well as actual violations were
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assessing the legality of a joint venture or merger.25 Congressional
hearings on the amendment indicated only that Congress may have felt
that per se rules based purely on statistical evidence of high market
concentration would be too rigid.26 Consequently, the courts were
faced with the difficult task of formulating standards by which to judge
the legality of joint ventures and mergers based on the objective of
maintaining a high degree of competition. 27
The Cases: Elements of the Potential-Competition Doctrine
The Supreme Court Formulation
Although the Court earlier had discussed the problem of potential
competition in several merger cases, 28 it first attempted to develop a
potential-competition analysis for determining whether joint ventures
violated section 7 in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co. 2 9 In
Penn-Olin, Pennsalt Chemical Corporation formed a joint venture with
Olin Mathieson Company to produce sodium chlorate30 in the South-
eastern United States. Olin had never before engaged in the produc-
subject to prosecution under the amendment. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 319 n.33 (1962).
The amended Act allowed the government to challenge a merger or joint venture based
on a probability of future anticompetitive effects. Therefore, a proposed merger with no
present anticompetitive consequences could be prohibited on the ground thatfuture compe-
tition might be lessened. Id at 321-23; S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950),
reprintedin 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4293, 4298.
25. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315, 320-22 (1962). See Brodley,
supra note 15, at 3.
26. H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949); see Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 321 n.36 (1962).
27. The history of § 7's development reveals a consistent philosophical theme that in-
ternal growth is preferable to enlargement by acquisition. An expanded range of business
activity has been made subject to review by the courts to implement this policy. See Depart-
ment of Justice, Merger Guidelines, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4510; see update, Merger
Guidelines [Jan.-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1069, Special Supple-
ment (June 17, 1982). See generally IV P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 946-
47 (1980).
28. Two years earlier, in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), the
Supreme Court set forth a § 7 standard relating to vertical and horizontal mergers. In sev-
eral other decisions prior to Penn-Olin, the Court referred to the concept of potential-compe-
tition and spoke of the harm that is caused by eliminating prospective competition. See
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. Columbia
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948); accord United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d
416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. United Shoe Machinery, 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), a f'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
29. 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
30. Sodium chlorate is used to bleach pulp in the production of high-quality paper. Id
at 161.
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tion of sodium chlorate. Pennsalt had manufactured the chemical in
other regions of the United States and, prior to the agreement, had en-
tered into contracts with Olin to distribute the product in the Southeast.
The two companies were market competitors in the production of non-
chlorate chemicals.
31
The Court recognized that the immediate consequence of the joint
venture would be to spur competition in the relevant market32 by in-
creasing the number of market participants. The Court remanded for
additional findings, noting that the lower court could invalidate the
joint venture if it found that each joint venturer would have selected
more competitive methods of entry into the market had it not entered
into the joint venture agreement. 33 For example, entry by one com-
pany alone would have resulted in more competition than the joint
venture created if the second company continued to pose the threat of
potential competition by standing ready to enter the market at any op-
portune moment, and thereby exerting downward pricing pressure on
the firms actually competing in the market.34 Justice Clark, writing for
the majority in Penn-Olin, enumerated twelve factors to aid courts in
determining whether future competition would be decreased impermis-
sibly by a joint venture arrangement.
35
31. Id at 162.
32. The relevant market is the geographic area where suppliers of the same or a related
product significantly restrain one another's power. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 239-
40 (3d ed. 1981); see also United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 660-73
(1974) (discussing the concept of "relevant market"). The product market is determined by
the "reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the prod-
uct itself and substitutes for it." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962)
(footnote omitted).
33. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. at 173-74.
34. Id at 172-74. This market condition is frequently referred to as "waiting in the
wings" or the "wings effect." United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 625
(1974).
35. 378 U.S. at 176-77. The twelve factors are: (1) the number and power of the com-
petitors in the market; (2) the background of their growth; (3) the power of the joint ventur-
ers; (4) the relationship of their lines of commerce; (5) the competition existing between
them and the power of each in dealing with the competitors of the other; (6) the setting in
which the joint venture was created; (7) the reasons and necessities for its existence; (8) the
joint venture's line of commerce and the relationship thereof to that of its parents; (9) the
adaptability of its line of commerce to noncompetitive practices; (10) the potential power of
the joint venture in the relevant market; (11) an appraisal of what the competition in the
relevant market would have been if one of the joint venturers had entered it alone instead of
through the joint venture; (12) the effect, in the event of this occurrence, of the other joint
venturer's potential competition and such other factors as might indicate potential risk to
competition in the relevant market.
Despite the detailed criteria enumerated by Justice Clark, some courts have found the
analysis set forth in Penn-Olin difficult to apply. See, e.g., Missouri Portland Cement Co. v.
Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 861 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 883 (1974) (citations
omitted): "While the [Supreme Court in Penn-Olin] did not distinguish clearly between the
present effect on competition of a company threatening to enter the market and the prospec-
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In three later cases, the Court applied the Penn-Olin analysis to
conglomerate mergers,36 distilling and refining the elements of the po-
tential-competition doctrine. In FTC v. Procter & Gamble, 37 the Court
identified two core issues: whether the merger would reduce future
competition by increasing barriers to entry, and whether Procter &
Gamble could be expected to enter the bleach market by internal ex-
pansion if the merger were disallowed.
38
The controversy in Procter & Gamble arose when Procter sought to
acquire Clorox, a manufacturer of household liquid bleach.3 9 Nation-
ally, the two firms accounted for almost sixty-five percent of all sales of
household cleaning products. 40 The Court concluded that, if Procter &
Gamble entered the market, smaller firms would be dissuaded from
competing because of Procter's substantial assets, advertising ability,
and name recognition.4 t The Court found both that Procter & Gam-
ble's presence on the "edge" of the bleach market exerted downward
pressure on the pricing decisions of other bleach manufacturers,42 and
that Procter was the most likely independent entrant into the bleach
market.43 Based on these findings, the Court concluded that the pro-
posed merger was likely to lead to further concentration of an already
concentrated market. 4
five effect on competition of a company that may enter the market in the future, .. it
plainly sanctioned the general applicability of the potential competition doctrine to § 7
cases. However, beyond suggesting the broad parameters of the doctrine, Penn-Olin pro-
vides little comfort.. "
Legal commentators also have criticized the standard in colorful terms. One commen-
tator has written: "No one who reads this laundry list can believe that the Court had a clear
understanding either of the problem of potential competition or of the practical limitations
of judicial fact-finding." Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court An Anaosis of the
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 282, 314 (1975). Another critic has added: "[The twelve] criteria were a witches'
brew of performance and conduct ingredients .... " Brodley, supra note 15, at 13.
36. The Court's development of the potential-competition standard in the context of
mergers is important in the analysis of joint venture problems because courts have applied
the same tests to both areas. See note 158 & accompanying text infra.
37. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
38. Id at 577-81.
39. The acquisition was termed a conglomerate product extension merger by the Court
because Procter & Gamble and Clorox were not manufacturers of the same products, and
therefore were not actual competitors. Procter & Gamble produced household detergents,
soaps, and cleansers, while Clorox manufactured bleach. 386 U.S. at 577.
40. Id at 571.
41. Id at 579.
42. Procter & Gamble's subjective intentions regarding independent entry into the
bleach market were deemed irrelevant. The Court relied on market share figures and a
history of competitive behavior in the bleach market in another geographic market area. Id
at 578-79.
43. Id at 580-81.
44. Id at 578-79.
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In Procter & Gamble, the Court added three important elements to
the analysis of an acquisition's legality under the potential-competition
doctrine. First, entry into a new market by means of acquisition is
likely to be found illegal when the acquisition increases barriers to en-
try and thereby dissuades smaller firms from competing.45 Second, the
potential-competition doctrine becomes applicable when the acquisi-
tion eliminates a potential entrant that previously exerted a procompe-
titive influence on the relevant market.46 Third, the doctrine becomes
applicable only when other identifiable potential entrants are scarce.
The loss of one potential entrant is meaningless when there are several
others that are exerting the same procompetitive influence on the
market.
47
The significance of Procter & Gamble is that it established the di-
rection of potential-competition analysis. The potential-competition
analysis as used in Procter & Gamble focuses on probabilities, not on
actual anticompetitive practices, and requires a prediction of the
merger's effect on present and future competition.
In United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,48 decided five years
after Procter & Gamble, the Court again analyzed the effect of a merger
on potential competition, incorporating more speculative and difficult
predictions about market behavior and the competitive consequences
of that conduct into its analysis. Prior to its merger in 1965 with Nara-
gansett Brewing Corporation, a small Northeastern regional brewer,
Falstaff had not marketed in the Northeast. The issue was whether
Falstaff exerted a procompetitive influence on the Northeastern market
prior to the merger.
49
Presenting evidence that it could not profitably have entered the
Northeastern market de novo, 50 Falstaff contended that it did not con-
sider itself to be a potential entrant in that market.51 The Court con-
45. Id
46. Id at 578, 580-81.
47. Id at 581. In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan proposed an additional ele-
ment to the standard. He determined that the courts should weigh the economic efficiencies
to be achieved by the merger against its anticompetitive consequences in determining the
legality of the acquisition. Id at 597 (Harlan, J., concurring). This view represents a signifi-
cant recognition of the relevance of efficiency in an analysis of a § 7 potential-competition
case. Justice Harlan was also critical of the fact that the Court had been vague in enunciat-
ing a standard: "[I]t is incumbent upon us. . .to embark upon the formulation of standards
for the application of § 7 to mergers which are neither horizontal nor vertical ...." Id at
583. "[T]he Court has failed to make a convincing analysis of the difficult problem
presented .. d.." I  at 586.
48. 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
49. Id at 532-33.
50. De novo entry is entry into a market by internal expansion, such as development of
manufacturing capability or extension of distribution and sales outlets. Id
51. Id at 533.
[Vol. 33
July 1982] CONGLOMERATE JOINT VENTURES
cluded, however, that Falstaff s subjective intentions were irrelevant,
whereas objective data regarding the company's resources and capacity
to enter the market and the perceptions of other brewers in the North-
eastern market about the likelihood of Falstaff's independent entry
were considered relevant.
5 2
The Court noted that the potential-competition doctrine ensured
that a combination did not substantially decrease competition either by
removing the presence of a likely competitor 53 or by creating additional
barriers to entry that would discourage other potential entrants from
competing.54 The Court concluded that Falstaff's acquisition of Nara-
gansett might have violated section 7 by substantially lessening compe-
tition.55 The Court therefore remanded the case to the district court for
a determination of whether Falstaff had exerted a procompetitive influ-
ence prior to the merger by its presence on the fringe of the market.
56
In a concurring opinion, Justice Marshall attempted to provide a
more comprehensive scheme for deciding the issue of potential compe-
tition. According to Justice Marshall, there are three categories of
firms whose entry into the market by acquisition may result in an even-
tual lessening of competition in violation of section 7. The first type of
competitor is a firm with overpowering resources, the "dominant en-
trant." Upon entry by acquisition, this type of competitor would have
the anticompetitive effect of driving out marginal companies and dis-
couraging others from competing in the market. Therefore, such entry
should be disallowed under section 7.57
The second type of competitor, the "perceived potential entrant,"
is one viewed by other market competitors as having the capacity to
enter the market de novo based on its resources, its business expertise,
and the absence of legal restrictions. Thus, prior to entry by acquisi-
tion, the firm exerts a procompetitive influence on the pricing decisions
of the other firms in the relevant market. Justice Marshall argued that
when an acquisition involving this type of firm would eliminate the
wings effect, the acquisition should be disallowed. 58
52. Id This preference for objective evidence was supported by Justice Marshall in his
concurring opinion. He added that, as subjective company evidence regarding its intentions
and capabilities was self-serving, and therefore inherently unreliable, it should be consid-
ered only to the extent that it corroborates objective economic evidence. Id at 563-69 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring).
53. Id at 531-32. This element appears to be drawn from the Penn-Olin decision. See
378 U.S. at 173-74.
54. See 410 U.S. at 531. This concern was enunciated previously in FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578-80 (1967).
55. See 410 U.S. at 534-36. The Court appeared to rely heavily on the testimony of
other beer marketers in reaching its conclusion. Id at 533-34.
56. Id at 537.
57. Id at 558-59 (Marshall, 3., concurring).
58. Id at 559-60 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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Finally, the third type of competitor, the "actual potential en-
trant," is an acquiring firm that currently is not exerting any competi-
tive influence on the market because it is not seen by other firms as a
potential competitor.59 If future de novo entry could be expected to
have increased competitive pressures within the market, then entry by
acquisition should be prohibited under section 7.60
In United States v. Marine Bancorporation,6 1 the Supreme Court
elaborated on Justice Marshall's classifications. The Court announced
that a merger involving an actual potential entrant might violate sec-
tion 7 if a present merger were shown to create a substantial likelihood
of harm to future competition. Under this analysis, the merger would
be unlawful only if the acquiring firm had alternative feasible means
62
to enter the market, and that entry was substantially likely to result in
deconcentration. 63 The Court also concluded that it might sustain a
section 7 challenge to a merger involving a perceived potential entrant
because of the effect the merger would have on present competition.
Accordingly, the merger would be unlawful
if the target market is substantially concentrated, if the acquiring
firm has the characteristics, capabilities, and economic incentive to
render it a perceived potential de novo entrant, and if the acquiring
firm's premerger presence on the fringe of the target market in fact
tempered oligopolistic behavior on the part of existing participants in
that market. 4
Thus, out of the twelve broad Penn- Olin criteria,65 the Court in Marine
Bancorporation developed a formula focusing primarily on the issue of
market concentration.
The defendant in Marine Bancorporation owned a nationally
chartered bank doing business in northwest Washington state. The
59. Id at 560-62 (Marshall, J., concurring). The actual potential entrant might not be
exerting any present competitive influence on the market, id at 560 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring), but its ability to do so is relevant.
60. Id at 560-61 (Marshall, J., concurring).
61. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
62. See id at 632-39. The alternative feasible means refers to entry that is either de
novo or a toehold acquisition. Professor Postol has defined a toehold acquisition as the
purchase of "a small firm in a market in which the acquiring firm is not engaged. A toehold
acquisition is encouraged because it increases competition in the market by strengthening a
small and presumably weak competitor. The Federal Trade Commission has stated that it
will consider the acquisition of a firm with 10% or less of the market a toehold acquisition."
Postol, Evaluating Vertical Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 31 HASTINGS L.J.
371, 412 (1979). The FTC policy statement can be found in In re Budd Co., 86 F.T.C. 518,
581 (1975). But see United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal.
1973), affdmem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974) (7% market share not a toehold). This concept is also
known as "foothold acquisition." 418 U.S. at 633.
63. See 418 U.S. at 632-36.
64. Id at 624-25.
65. See note 35 supra.
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northwest Washington subsidiary of the national bank entered the
heavily concentrated eastern Washington banking market by acquiring
a medium size, state-chartered bank already operating there.66 This
merger was challenged by the government on the grounds that the sub-
sidiary otherwise would have entered the market independently; that
prior to the merger, the subsidiary exerted a procompetitive wings ef-
fect on the eastern region, which was lost as a result of the merger; and
that the acquired company might have developed into a reasonably
powerful bank absent the merger.
67
In determining whether a business transaction involving an actual
potential entrant violated the Clayton Act because of a lessening of
future competition, the Court formulated a three-part test and indi-
cated that all three parts of the test would have to be satisfied before a
violation would be found.68 The first requirement of the test was a
determination of the applicability of the potential-competition doctrine
based on the freedom of the industry from legal impediments to en-
try.69 If an industry is heavily regulated, the Marine Bancorporation
analysis indicates that the doctrine "will seldom bar a geographic mar-
ket extension merger."'70 Comprehensive regulation that controls the
movement of competitors in and out of new markets invalidates the
free-market assumptions on which potential-competition theory is
based.71 In Marine Bancorporation, the Court found that the commer-
cial banking industry was heavily regulated, but proceeded to apply the
doctrine because of strong precedent, suggesting that the mere presence
of some regulation will not immunize an industry against section 7
prosecution.72
The second requirement was high *concentration within the rele-
vant merger market. The Court indicated that this element was essen-
tial because a deconcentrated, competitive market would not be
affected by the elimination of a potential entrant. 73 The Court did not
indicate the level of concentration that would permit a clear finding of
a violation of section 7. The Court found, however, that the concentra-
tion ratios in the eastern Washington banking market were high
enough to establish a prima facie case, allowing the application of the
66. 418 U.S. at 606-07.
67. Id at 615, 626.
68. See id at 632-39.
69. Id at 630. The Court cited examples of restrictive regulation prohibiting entry into
new markets, including Washington state laws prohibiting de novo branching, branching
from a branch office, and multibank holding companies. Id at 606, 626-27.
70. Id at 641.
71. See id at 629-30, 641.
72. Id at 626-27.




The third requirement of the test was that the defendant be able to
enter the market by methods other than merger, and that the alternate
means offer a "substantial likelihood of ultimately producing decon-
centration. ' 75 Although the government argued that it was possible for
the defendant to satisfy this requirement by opening a single branch
office, the Court found that, because of government regulations re-
straining bank growth, the toehold acquisition could not reasonably be
expected to lead to deconcentration. 76 The Court concluded that the
merger had not violated section 7 because it had not been shown that
future competition would be lessened.
77
The government also was unable to persuade the Court that pres-
ent competition had been decreased unlawfully as a consequence of the
acquisition. The Court reasoned that, as a result of extensive banking
regulation, other banks in the eastern Washington banking market
could not reasonably have perceived the subsidiary bank as posing a
competitive threat.
78
The Court in Marine Bancorporation to some extent avoided pre-
dictions of future market behavior. It determined that a successful
challenge based on effects on future competition must establish that,
but for the acquisition, additional, identifiable competition probably
would result, and that the new competition probably would be
substantial.7 9
After Marine Bancorporation, the standard for evaluating the in-
fluence of an acquisition onfuture competition depends on whether the
market is relatively free of government regulation and is concentrated
to a noncompetitive degree; whether the new market entrant, as an ac-
tual potential entrant, would have found an alternative route to gaining
access into the market if denied entry by merger; and whether that al-
ternative reasonably can be expected to have a procompetitive influ-
ence on the market.
80
74. Id. The government introduced evidence that three banks in the relevant market
controlled approximately 92% of all deposits. Id at 631.
75. 418 U.S. at 633.
76. Id at 636.
77. See id at 638-39.
78. Id at 640. The Court relied on the standard as enunciated in Falstaff, 410 U.S. at
533. See note 52 & accompanying text supra.
79. 418 U.S. at 641-42; see V P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1121d
(1980).
80. The opinion leaves unanswered whether § 7 bans a market extension merger that
does not alter market competition, and that would be challengeable only on the grounds that
a de novo or toehold entry would have resulted in more competition. United States v.
Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 625-26, 639 (1974). The Fifth Circuit recently con-
cluded that § 7 of the Clayton Act does not apply to combinations that do not lessen, but
merely fail to increase, competition. Mercantile Texas Corp. v. Board of Governors of the
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The standard for evaluating an unlawful diminution of present
competition is composed of two elements: (1) a measure of concentra-
tion levels in the relevant market, and (2) a determination of whether
the new market entrant was recognized previously by other firms in the
market as being a competitive threat by its presence on the fringe of the
market. High market concentration and a finding that the acquiring
company was a perceived potential entrant make acquisition entry
impermissible.
Application of the Potential-Competition Doctrine by Lower Courts
Lower courts have made various modifications to the potential-
competition standard in order to make its application feasible.8' For
example, in FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co. ,82 the Fourth Circuit required
a clear showing that the acquiring firm would have entered the market
de novo.8 3 In that case, Atlantic Richfield (ARCO), a producer of pe-
troleum products and natural gas, attempted to acquire Anaconda, a
comlpany principally engaged in the mining and processing of copper.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) charged that the merger would
substantially lessen potential competition between ARCO and produ-
cers of copper in the relevant market.8 4 The FTC conceded that
ARCO was not a perceived potential entrant into the copper market.
The issue to be decided was whether ARCO, as an actual potential
entrant, should be enjoined from merging with Anaconda when there
Fed. Reserve Sys., 638 F.2d 1255, 1265 (5th Cir. 1981). For an argument in support of a
finding that § 7 applies to combinations that reduce future competition, see Brodley, supra
note 15, at 47-52.
81. Professor Brodley has taken the position that the Marine Bancorporalion standard
requires a lower court to undertake an analysis of parent company conduct and of market
performance. The former requires a determination of the likelihood that a parent company
would enter the market independently based on objective economic data, and a review of
the subjective intentions of the company, that is, of the company's internal assessment of
whether such entry would make good business sense. The latter involves an analysis of the
effect the joint venture will have on price, product quality, or product innovation. See
Brodley, supra note 15, at 54-56.
In United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 626-30, 641, the Court
avoided this detailed analysis by relying on the assumption that regulation necessarily
restricted firm growth. In the majority of cases, however, the market is unregulated and
courts have tried to analyze the complex and frequently inconclusive economic data. See,
e.g, United States v. Siemens Corp., 621 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1980); BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC,
557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977); FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977); see
also Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 419
U.S. 883 (1974) (pre-Marine Bancorporation case applying economic data); United States v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (pre-MarineBancorporadon case
applying economic data), aft'dmer. 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
82. 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977).
83. Id at 300.
84. Id at 292.
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was less than clear proof that ARCO would have entered the copper
market independently.
85
The court ultimately held that the merger was not unlawful be-
cause the FTC was unable to meet its burden of establishing unequivo-
cally that ARCO, but for the merger, would have entered the copper
market de novo. 86 The Fourth Circuit apparently rejected the govern-
ment's argument based on speculative market predictions in favor of a
standard requiring a determination that potential competition actually
was undermined.
In Mercantile Texas Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System ,87 the Fifth Circuit set forth supplemental guidelines to
aid the parties and the Court in determining the "validity and applica-
bility of the potential competition doctrine. ' 88 These supplemental in-
structions addressed the problem of predicting deconcentration. In
Mercantile, the Federal Reserve Board had denied an application for a
merger between Mercantile Texas, the fifth largest bank holding com-
pany in Texas, and PanNational, a smaller banking institution8 9 doing
business ninety-five miles from Mercantile's offices. The Board denied
the merger application on the ground that Mercantile was an actual
potential entrant into PanNational's marketing areas.90 When Mercan-
tile Texas appealed the denial, the Fifth Circuit remanded the matter to
the Board of Governors, instructing the Board to provide additional
evidence that independent entry by Mercantile Texas would result in
deconcentration or other significant procompetitive effects. 9' The Fifth
Circuit indicated that the evidence should show that de novo independ-
ent entry by Mercantile Texas would result in an increased distribution
of economic power and enable Mercantile to accumulate a market
share sufficiently large to challenge the dominance of the established
firms, thereby resulting in market growth despite government
85. Id. at 299-300. The Fourth Circuit began its discussion by noting the lack of clarity
in the potential-competition doctrine as it applies to actual potential entrants. Id at 294.
The Court then fashioned its own standard for determining a violation based on what it
called "peripheral support" in the cases, id, and the recommendations of Professor Turner,
id See Turner, sufpra note 4. The court in Atlantic Richfield cited Professor Turner's article
as a "careful analysis" of this area of the law. 549 F.2d at 294.
86. Id at 300.
87. 638 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1981).
88. Id at 1272.
89. Mercantile Texas controlled nearly five times the deposits held by PanNational.
Id at 1259.
90. Id
91. Id at 1269-72. The Fifth Circuit required analysis of the following profitability
factors: (1) the profitability of independent entry by Mercantile into the PanNational mar-
ket area, (2) other opportunities for investment available to Mercantile discounted by the
costs of entry into those areas, and (3) some evidence indicating that Mercantile should
prefer independent entry into the relevant market to other options. Id. at 1269.
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regulations.92
The court also suggested that two additional considerations be
taken into account by the Board. The first was whether the relevant
market had become deconcentrated in the period between the initial
denial of the application and the final adjudication of the matter. The
second was whether the merger had possible procompetitive effects that
would outweigh any anticompetitive consequences.93 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit in Mercantile seemed to favor a standard demanding more
proof and less conjecture in potential-competition cases by requiring
additional factual findings to supplement the broad policy elements
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Marine Bancorporation.
A third example of federal court application of the potential-com-
petition standard is Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC.94 In Yamaha, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed an FTC ruling ordering the dissolution of a
joint venture between a Brunswick subsidiary and the Yamaha Motor
Company.95 Prior to the joint venture, both parent companies were
engaged individually in the manufacture of outboard motors for sale in
their respective markets. The agreement entered into by the companies
in 1972 provided for shared investment in the production of outboard
motors for boats. The motors were to be manufactured in Japan and
sold internationally. The Brunswick subsidiary had exclusive market-
ing rights to sell the motors in the United States while Yamaha retained
exclusive selling rights in the Japanese market. The joint venture was
characterized by the Eighth Circuit as a horizontal acquisition, which
merely added to the productive capacity of Brunswick.
96
The principal issues in the case were whether Yamaha had alter-
native feasible means of entering the relevant market, and whether
such an entry offered a substantial likelihood of producing deconcen-
tration.97 The court applied the Marine Bancorporation potential-com-
petition standard for an actual potential entrant and found that the
joint venture violated section 7. The Eighth Circuit was persuaded that
the outboard motor market was heavily concentrated, and that alterna-
tive means of entry were available to Yamaha that would have resulted
in deconcentration of the American market. 98 The court reached this
conclusion despite findings of fact by the administrative law judge that
Yamaha had made two unsuccessful attempts, to enter the American
market, and despite the testimony of Yamaha and Brunswick managers
92. Id at 1271-72.
93. Id at 1271. Justice Harlan raised this issue in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386
U.S. 568, 581 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See note 47 supra.
94. 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981).
95. Id at 973.
96. Id at 980.
97. id at 977.
98. Id at 979.
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that Yamaha could not have entered the American market indepen-
dently at the time of the joint venture. 99
The court also rejected Brunswick's contention that the venture
would have had procompetitive effects. The defendants argued that
any anticompetitive effect of the agreement would be offset by procom-
petitive consequences, including the addition of a new force to the mar-
ket, the limited duration of the agreement, and Yamaha's enhanced
ability to enter de novo upon the termination of the venture. 100 The
Eighth Circuit concluded that the addition of the joint venture to the
United States market was "not of great significance when one considers
that it was controlled by Brunswick and cannot be reasonably expected
to compete actively with the parent firm."'' Consequently, Brunswick
was required to divest itself of its stock interest in the joint venture.
The Eighth Circuit thus relied almost exclusively on a finding of
high market concentration in its potential-competition analysis. The
court assumed that Yamaha would enter the United States outboard
motor market independently. It further assumed that the mere fact of
the company's presence in an oligopolistic market necessarily would
have procompetitive effects.' 02 By refusing to inquire into the business
rationale for the joint venture or its likely procompetitive conse-
quences, the Eighth Circuit appeared to adopt the position that a joint
venture involving a potential competitor in a concentrated market
nearly always should be held illegal.
In re Exxon Corp. Litigation
In 1973, the FTC brought suit against the eight largest American
petroleum-producing companies, alleging that joint venture activity in
offshore leasing, pipeline ownership, and international operations, had
substantially lessened competition in the relevant markets. 0 3 The FTC
99. Id at 978-79.
100. Id. at 979.
101. Id. at 980.
102. See id
103. In re Exxon Corp., F.T.C. No. 8934, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder, Complaints &
Orders] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) T 20,388 (filed July 12, 1973). The eight companies in-
volved were: Atlantic Richfield Co.; Exxon Corp.; Gulf Oil Corp.; Mobil Oil Corp.; Shell
Oil Corp.; Standard Oil of Cal.; Standard Oil (Indiana); Texaco, Inc. The complaint
charged that the companies had pursued an unlawful common course of action to exploit
ownership and control of crude oil, and alleged numerous anticompetitive activities. See
[1973-1976 Transfer Binder, Complaints & Orders] TRADE REG. RaP. (CCH) at 20,270-
71. This discussion is limited to the allegations regarding the joint venture activity of the
companies. For illustrative purposes the relevant time period has been limited to 1972-1973,
the period immediately preceding the FTC's filing of the complaint. Courts would be free,
however, to analyze the anticompetitive effects of the joint activity as of the time of trial.
See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 596-97 (1957). The
government relied on § 45(a)(5) (generally referred to as § 5) of the F.T.C. Act, 15 U.S.C.
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dismissed the case in September 1981, explaining that the additional
effort and three years' time necessary to narrow the issues and prepare
for trial were not presently warranted.' 04 Although the court did not
reach the merits of the case, application of the Marine Bancorporation
analysis to the facts of In re Exxon provides an ideal opportunity to
examine how a federal court might apply the potential-competition
doctrine to an oil industry joint venture.1
0 5
In In re Exxon, the respondents entered into joint venture agree-
ments with some members of the natural gas industry for Outer Conti-
nental Shelf (OCS) lease bidding and the construction of offshore wells
and drilling platforms. 0 6 The oil company participants acquired con-
§§ 41-77 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), as the legal foundation for its complaint. A Clayton Act
§ 7 claim could have been brought, however, based on allegations in the complaint and
subsequent discovery efforts focusing on respondents' activities in the OCS crude oil market
and the likelihood that competition in that market had been substantially lessened through
the use of joint venture arrangements. See Order Denying Respondents' Joint Motion to
Strike All Claims and Issues and to Quash Subpoena Specifications Relating to Offshore
Leasing, In re Exxon Corp., F.T.C. No. 8934 (order dated July 7, 1978).
104. Complaint Counsel's Response to Order Requesting Briefing at 41, In re Exxon
Corp., F.T.C. No. 8934, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder, Complaints & Orders] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 20,388; San Francisco Chron., Sept. 17, 1981, at 30, col. 5.
105. The Department of Justice published a 1968 policy paper describing the types of
mergers that would be challenged for excessive industry concentration. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4510. The guidelines pro-
vided that a merger with a potential market entrant would be regarded by the Department
as a threat to competition when the merging firm is "one of the four largest firms in a market
in which the shares of the eight largest firms amount to approximately 75% or more, pro-
vided that the merging firm's share of the market amounts to approximately 10% or more;"
or when a potential entrant combines with "one of the eight largest firms in a market in
which the shares of these firms amount to approximately 75% or more, provided either that
the merging firm's share of the market is not insubstantial and there are no more than one or
two likely entrants into the market, or that the merging firm is a rapidly growing firm." Id
at 6888. The guidelines also detail additional factors that would cause the Department auto-
matically to challenge a merger with a potential entrant.
The Department of Justice issued a new statement on the merger guidelines on June 14,
1982. Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines, [Jan.-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) No. 1069, Special Supplement (June 17, 1982). The emphasis on firm concen-
tration ratios has been replaced by a standard weighing a variety of factors, including the
conditions of entry and the acquiring firm's entry advantage, in addition to market share
analysis. Id at S-9. Despite these changes, the standard continues to reflect the conclusion
that highly concentrated markets are conducive to anticompetitive conduct. Id at S-3. Ac-
cording to the revised guidelines, a highly concentrated market for potential-competition
purposes is one in which the relevant market is controlled by no more than six firms of equal
size. Id at S-6, S-9. The previous method of calculating four- and seven-firm concentration
ratios, however, has been replaced by a new measure, the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index.
This Index proposes economic analyses more complex than those set forth in the 1968
guidelines.
106. As the matter was not fully litigated, ultimate findings of fact were never made by
the court. The factual statement set forth here has been drawn from the pleadings, motions
filed by the parties, and from other government documents. See notes 107-12 infra.
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trol of the crude oil drilled, while the gas company participants re-
ceived ownership rights to all natural gas deposits discovered during
drilling operations. 10 7 Prior to the joint venture agreements, the natu-
ral gas companies had engaged in independent offshore drilling opera-
tions.108 The respondents' total share of OCS crude oil and natural gas
production was 66.7% for 1972.109 Viewing the relevant geographic
market as OCS land off the eastern and Gulf Coast states and the rele-
vant product market as OCS crude oil," l0 the FTC maintained that this
percentage considerably underestimated the actual market control ex-
ercised by the respondents. The FTC suggested that the eight respon-
dents' effective control of the crude oil market exceeded 75%."'1 The
FTC also contended that the respondents' joint activities with gas com-
pany partners in OCS leasing and production exerted an anticompeti-
tive effect on the OCS market by discouraging possible competitors
from entering, thereby helping to maintain a noncompetitive market
structure.112
107. Complaint Counsel's First Statement of Issues, Factual Contentions and Proof at
49, In re Exxon Corp., F.T.C. No. 8934 (dated Oct. 31, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Complaint
Counsel's First Statement].
108. In 1969, Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) natural gas production totalled 1,851,583
million cubic feet. Competition and Concentration in the Natural Gas Industry.- Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. pt. 1, 738 (1973). By 1971, OCS contributions to domestic natural gas production
equalled 3,770,550 million cubic feet. Oversight on Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.: Hear-
ings on S. Res. 45 Before the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 116
(1972). It should be noted that many of the largest crude oil producers also engage in the
exploration and production of natural gas. Competition and Concentration in the Natural Gas
Industry. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, 457 (1973) (statement of Dr. John W. Wilson, Chief,
Division of Economic Studies, Federal Power Commission). See generall FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIOR IN THE NAT-
URAL GAS PRODUCTION INDUSTRY (1979) (analysis of competition in the natural gas
industry).
109. "[This share is] compared with a 52.8% share of total (offshore plus onshore) pro-
duction." Complaint Counsel's Opposition to Respondents' Joint Motion to Strike All
Claims and Issues and to Quash Subpoena Specifications Relating to Offshore Leasing at 7-
8, In re Exxon Corp., F.T.C. No. 8934 (dated June 16, 1978).
110. In the relevant geographic market, OCS crude accounted for approximately 17% of
total crude production. The FTC argued that "[i]nclusion of offshore production activities is
therefore important in order to allow a complete consideration of the structure and behavior
of the crude oil markets." Id at 7.
111. The FTC argued that traditional measures of market power substantially under-
stated the true degree of control that respondents exercised over the disposition of domestic
crude oil as a result of crude oil gathering systems, joint ownership of crude trunk pipelines,
purchases of royalty oil, joint operating agreements, and joint ventures in exploration and
production. Complaint Counsel's First Statement, supra note 107, at 47-48.
112. See Complaint Counsel's Opposition to Respondents' Joint Motion to Strike All
Claims and Issues and to Quash Subpoena Specifications Relating to Offshore Leasing at 6,
12-13. The FTC argued that the respondents' acquisition of crude oil leases, production of
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Oil Industry Structure
The American petroleum industry is characterized by three pre-
dominant structural features: moderate concentration, a high degree of
vertical integration, and an extensive network of joint activities."l3 The
industry consists of eight major segments: oil exploration, gas explora-
tion, crude oil production, gas production, crude transportation, gas
transportation, refining, and sales.
As each segment is composed of numerous submarkets, I" 4 one
crude oil, and disposition of crude oil revealed an intent to maintain a noncompetitive mar-
ket structure in the refining of crude oil. Id at 6. The FTC also claimed that respondents
set and maintained supracompetitive prices for crude oil through use of posted prices and
crude oil exchanges. Complaint Counsel's First Statement, supra note 107, at 92-104. The
analysis herein relies primarily on two congressional reports: SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR
& INSULAR AFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., JOINT BIDDING FOR FEDERAL ONSHORE OIL
AND GAS LANDS, AND COAL AND OIL SHALE LANDS (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited
as JOINT BIDDING]; Energy Industry Investigation: Hearings Before the Judiciary Comm. of
the House ofReps., 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., Serial No. 48, pt. 1 (1975). See generaly U.S.
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF STATISTICAL SUMMARY
(1977) [hereinafter cited as OCS STATISTICAL SUMMARY]; U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, LEASE PRODUCTION REVENUE 11.8.1 (process date Sept. 22, 1977);
Jones, Mead & Sorenson, Free Entry Into Crude Oil and Gas Production and Competition in
the U.S. Oii ndustry, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 859, 869 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Jones,
Mead & Sorenson]. The source of the statistics on OCS lease bidding relied upon by the
FTC in its complaint is not available.
The Bureau of Land Management offered lease sale numbers 31 and 32 in 1973. JOINT
BIDDING, supra at 27. Both sales involved tracts located in the relevant geographic market.
The first sale offered drilling rights for tracts off the coasts of Texas and Louisiana. The
second sale offered lands off the coasts of Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana. Id A total
of 193 tracts were available for leasing. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, GEOLOGICAL SUR-
VEY, LEASE PRODUCTION REVENUE 11.8.1 (process date Sept. 22, 1977). See Jones, Mead &
Sorenson, supra, at 870. The respondents in Exxon entered independent bids on some
tracts. Energy Industry Investigation: Hearings Before the Judiciary Comm of the House of
Reps., 94th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess,, Serial No. 48, pt. 1, 343-45, 361-67 (1975). Seven respon-
dents also entered joint bids with several different combines. Id at 343-45. There were
eight new bidding entrants for the'year. OCS STATISTICAL SUMMARY, supra; Jones, Mead
& Sorenson, supra, at 869. The assets of the individual respondents appeared large enough
to suggest that each was financially capable of independent OCS exploration and develop-
ment activities. JOINT BIDDING, supra, at 31.
113. Flaim, The Structure ofthe U.S. Petroleum Industry: Joint Activities and Affiliations,
24 ANTITRUST BULL. 555, 556 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Flaim]. Vertical integration
means internal control of successive stages in production and distribution. C. EDWARDS,
MAINTAINING COMPETITION 98 (1949). Vertical integration in the petroleum industry de-
scribes producers that own and control exploration and production facilities, transportation
systems to move raw materials and refined products, refineries, and marketing outlets. See
FTC PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT, INVESTIGATION OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (1973);
see also M. DECHAZEAU & A. KAHN, INTEGRATION AND COMPETITION IN THE PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY 19-22 (1959); Adams, Cor.porate Power and Economic Apologetics: 4 Public Policy
Perspective, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 364-66 (1974).
114. For example, OCS oil and gas leasing is a submarket of the oil and gas production
segment.
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must consider the concentration figures of both segments and sub-
markets to appreciate fully the degree of concentration of the principal
firms in the oil industry. In the crude oil production segment, the top
four petroleum-producing firms in 1980 held market shares of 25.4%.
The largest eight companies controlled 40.8%.115 In the OCS lease bid-
ding submarket, the top four firms held a 27.4% share, the top eight,
50.3%.
116
Comparison of market share figures of oil-producing companies
with those in other manufacturing areas demonstrates that the oil in-
dustry is only moderately concentrated. A 1974 survey of a cross-sec-
tion of 292 American manufacturing industries revealed an average
industry combined market share for the top four producers in a given
market to be 41.5%. The top eight firms averaged a 54.3% share."i 7 Oil
industry concentration falls below the national average in both
categories. 18
Oil producing companies generally have integrated their opera-
tions to secure access to raw materials, to run refineries, and to mini-
mize marketing and transportation expenses.' 19 Access to a reliable
115. American Petroleum Institute, Market Shares and Individual Company Data for
U.S. Energy Markets, 1950-1980, 37 (Oct. 9, 1981) (Discussion Paper #014R) (production
statistics for crude oil include condensate and natural gas liquids).
116. OCS STATISTICAL SUMMARY, supra note 112; U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, GEO-
LOGICAL SURVEY, LEASE PRODUCTION REVENUE 11.8.1 (process date Sept. 22, 1977); Jones,
Mead & Sorenson, supra note 112, at 868-72.
117. Mueller & Hamm, Trends in Industrial Market Concentration 1947-1970, 65 REV.
ECON. STATISTIC 512 (1974). The survey reflected 1970 market concentration. These figures
show that the eight major companies controlled substantially less domestic crude production
than they did OCS production. Simultaneously, the top four firms had only a slightly larger
share of OCS production than they had of overall domestic production.
118. Petroleum industry concentration figures have been criticized as unreliable indica-
tors of market control, because of the high percentage of joint activity. See, e.g., Flaim,
supra note 113, at 568-71. The figures also reflect how defining the relevant market more
broadly lessens the appearance of control by the largest firms. For this reason, courts ap-
praise the competitive significance of an acquisition by looking at several product and geo-
graphic markets. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 336-39.
119. See DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, PETROLEUM MARKET SHARES, A MONTHLY RE-
PORT 13 (June 1981). This document reports the percentage of vertical integration in the oil
industry, derived from tabulating the number of American retail gasoline outlets affiliated
with a crude oil refiner. Affiliated outlets include both refiner-marketers and branded in-
dependents. The survey defines refiner-marketer as a company owning or controlling opera-
tions of one or more refineries and marketing gasoline through retail outlets. A branded
independent is either a company marketing and distributing petroleum products pursuant to
a refiner agreement to sell products using the refiner's trade name, or a company authorized
to occupy premises controlled by a refiner pursuant to a supply contract. Id The study
concluded that over 90% of all retail outlets were part of a vertically integrated chain. Id at
11. This translated into 145,090 outlets. In comparison, only 12,400 retail outlets were
purely independent marketers. Id at 13. A purely independent marketer, also known as a
non-branded independent, is a retail seller not engaged in the refining of crude oil and not
under contract with a refiner to sell petroleum products under the refiner's trade name.
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source of crude supply is a major reason for oil company integration.
Those companies not owning oil-producing land acquire crude oil by
three methods: foreign supplies, short- and long-term contracts with
crude producers, and participation in the domestic oil and gas lease
market. 20 The first two methods have proven to be highly uncer-
tain.' 2 1 The oil and gas leasing market has emerged as the only reliable
method of obtaining crude oil, despite the risk of failure and the high
capital commitments involved.
122
Joint activity between oil companies includes joint bidding ar-
rangements for offshore oil and gas leases, joint ventures in oil produc-
tion, jointly owned pipelines, and exchange and processing
agreements. 123 A 1974 congressional survey of the twelve largest verti-
cally integrated oil companies revealed that 70-75% of those compa-
nies' oil production activities were joint operations. The next twenty-
three nonmajor petroleum firms reported that 80% of their production
activity was performed jointly. 124
Mergers and joint venture proposals involving oil companies have
been subject to careful scrutiny by the Department of Justice and the
FTC. 25 With respect to OCS lease bidding, regulations promulgated
by the Department of the Interior in 1975 prohibit joint bidding involv-
ing more than one "major company."' 126 Despite this pattern of gov-
ernment discouragement, the potential benefits of participation in the
120. These methods of acquiring crude are not mutually exclusive. See Jones, Mead &
Sorenson, su.pra note 112, at 865.
121. Id at 865-67. Foreign supplies have been subject to dramatic price increases as a
result of OPEC cartel actions. Domestic crude producers simultaneously became unwilling
to commit themselves to long-term supply agreements following the 1973 embargo and en-
suing supply shortage. Id
122. Id
123. Flaim, supra note 113, at 558.
124. SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INTEGRATED OIL OPERATIONS, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE STRUCTURE OF THE U.S.
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, A SUMMARY OF SURVEY DATA 39, 42-49 (Comm. Print 1976);
Flaim, supra note 113, at 556-63. This extensive interaction between petroleum producers
prompted a House Judiciary Committee investigation in 1976. Energy Industry Investigation"
Hearings Before the Subcommt on Monopolies and Commercial Law, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976).
125. For examples of mergers and joint ventures involving oil companies which have
been challenged by the FTC, see In re British Petroleum & Standard Oil Co., F.T.C. No. C-
3074 (1981) (involving a merger) (on LEXIS, Trade library, FTC file); In re Atlantic Rich-
field Co., F.T.C. No. 9089, 94 F.T.C. 1054 (1979), modfed 96 F.T.C. 600 (1980) (involving a
merger); In re Exxon Corp., F.T.C. No. 8934, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder, Complaints &
Orders] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,388 (involving joint ventures); In re Amerada Hess
Corp., F.T.C. No. C-2456, 83 F.T.C. 487 (1973) (involving a merger); In re Phillips Petro-
leum Co., F.T.C. No. C-1088, 78 F.T.C. 1573,(1971) (involving a merger).
126. Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6213 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). A major company is defined
as one producing a combined total of 1.6 million barrels per day of crude oil, natural gas
liquids equivalents (liquified petroleum), and natural gas equivalents. Id
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OCS lease bidding market continue to make cooperation attractive to
many companies. 127
Companies engaged in offshore drilling risk several types of
financial loss, including loss of an advance bonus payment, 128 loss of
the costs of exploration and drilling, and loss from the sinking of un-
productive wells. 129 Additionally, any offshore drilling venture faces
the possibility that the crude reserves discovered will be insubstan-
tial. 130 Although a successful well may prove lucrative, a 1978 study
concluded that the average return on OCS production was low com-
pared to average returns in other manufacturing businesses.'
3'
The Bureau of Land Management first offered OCS lease sales in
1954,132 and has sold approximately two leases per year since then.
While many tracts receive no bids, the average is 3.66 bids per tract. 133
The ratio of joint to solo bidding has not been consistently high, but a
slight rise in the frequency of joint bidding has occurred in recent
years. 34 Joint bids are increasingly often the winning bids, whether
placed by major or by nonmajor oil companies. 35 The continuing
popularity of joint ventures in OCS exploration and development de-
127. In August 1981, the Bureau of Land Management offered a 10-year lease on a
5,700-acre tract 50 miles off the coast of North Carolina. The winning bid was a joint bid for
$103.7 million. At the same lease sale, a total of $561 million in bids was submitted for 54
tracts. San Francisco Chron., Aug. 5, 1981, at 27, col. 4.
128. The bonus payment is the actual bid. See Gremillion, Offshore Leases in the Guf of
Mexico--Joint Venture Agreements andRelated Matters, 25 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N
205, 212-13 (1974).
129. In 1976, the United States Geological Service (USGS) estimated that it cost eight
million dollars to construct a deep-water well. The USGS also concluded that there was a
90% probability that at least one well on a site would be unproductive. JOINT BIDDING,
supra note 112, at 48.
130. Id.
131. Jones, Mead & Sorenson, supra note 112, at 874-75.
132. JOINT BIDDING, supra note 112, at 6. The lease-bid procedure is as follows: the
Bureau of Land Management announces in the Federal Register the tracts to be released.
Interested parties respond with sealed bids and bonus payments on specified dates. The
government reserves the right to reject all bids and thereby deny the lease to the highest
bidder if the highest bid does not reflect, in the government's view, the fair market value of
the tract. Id at 20.
The identity of bidding partners need not be disclosed in the bids, so that the govern-
ment may not know in advance which are joint venture bids. The participants generally
execute formal agreements prior to embarking on any joint activity. The agreements con-
tain provisions for dealing with disputes between the joint venturers. These range from
disagreements over bid amounts, to the extent of exploration commitments, to penalties for
nonparticipation. See Gremillion, Offshore Leases in the Gulf of Mexico--Joint Venture
Agreements and Related Matters, 25 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 205, 205 (1974).
133. JOINT BIDDING, supra note 112, at 19.
134. Id at 26-29.
135. Id at 30-31.
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spite government restrictions suggests that their use will increase if
curbs on joint activity are eased.
In re Exxon OCS Joint Venture Activity 1972-1973: Potential-
Competition Analysis Under Marine Bancorporation
Applying the Marine Bancorporation formulation of the potential-
competition doctrine to the facts of In re Exxon requires evaluation of
the anticompetitive effects of OCS joint ventures on both present and
future competition.1 36 To judge the legality of the ventures under sec-
tion 7, the natural gas companies must be analyzed as both actual and
perceived potential entrants.
In determining whether the gas companies are actual potential en-
trants, the inquiry first focuses on whether potential competitors may
enter into offshore leasing and production markets relatively un-
hampered by regulation. 137 Since 1935, crude oil exploration and de-
velopment have been subject to various forms of regulation, including
market demand prorationing plans, oil import quotas, allocation pro-
grams, and price controls.138 The last series of regulations, beginning
with the price controls of August 15, 1971, was intended to reverse gen-
eral inflationary trends in the prices of goods and services.' 39 The regu-
136. See notes 69-80 & accompanying text supra.
137. See note 108 & accompanying text supra.
138. Congress in 1935 endorsed the Interstate Oil Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas.
Joint Resolution of Aug. 27, 1935, 49 Stat. 939 (1935). For a summary of the history of
crude oil pricing regulations, see Kraft & Rodekohr, Crude 01Price Controls: Their Purpose
andlImpact, 8 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 315 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Kraft & Rodekohr];
Mead, Petroleum: An UnregulatedIndustry? in ENERGY SUPPLY AND GOVERNMENT POLICY
130-60 (1976).
139. Exec. Order No. 11,615, 3 C.F.R. 602 (1971-1975 Compilation), reprinted in part in
12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1976). The first phase of pricing restraints was followed by four addi-
tional phases: Phase Two Price Controls were in effect from Nov. 15, 1971 to Jan. 11, 1973,
Exec. Order No. 11,627, 3 C.F.R. 621 (1971-1975 Compilation), reprinted in 36 Fed. Reg.
20,139 (1971). Phase Three Part I Controls were in effect from Jan. 12, 1973 to June 12,
1973, Exec. Order No. 11,695, 3 C.F.R. 741 (1971-1975 Compilation), reprinted in 38 Fed.
Reg. 1473 (1973). Phase Three Part II Price Controls were in effect from June 13, 1973 to
August 12, 1973, Exec. Order No. 11,723,3 C.F.R. 774 (1971-1975 Compilation), reprintedin
38 Fed. Reg. 15,765 (1973). Phase Four Price Controls were in effect from Aug. 13, 1973 to
December 1973, Exec. Order No. 11,730, 3 C.F.R. 787 (1971-1975 Compilation), regulations
set forth at 38 Fed. Reg. 19,462-86 (1973), amended, 38 Fed. Reg. 21,592-613 (1973). The
fourth phase of price controls created incentives to invest in high cost OCS production.
Kraft & Rodekohr, supra note 138, at 321-22. These pricing restraints were eliminated be-
ginning in 1975. Exec. Order No. 11,788, 3A C.F.R. 152 (1974 Compilation), reprinted in 12
U.S.C. § 1904 (1976). New regulations were enacted to keep the price of domestically pro-
duced crude oil below world market levels. Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975,42
U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (1976). See Kraft & Rodekohr, supra note 138, at 325-26. A portion of
the new regulations specifically prohibited joint bidding for OCS lands by more than one
major oil company, but allowed major producers to submit joint bids with smaller firms. In
1978, an amendment set forth exceptions to this prohibition applicable when the costs of
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latory activity prevalent in 1972-73 concerned crude oil pricing.
Government imposed ceilings on oil prices might have discouraged
both onshore and offshore production throughout this period; however,
they did not halt movement into the market. Although it is probable
that additional firms would have entered the market absent pricing re-
straints, the restraints did not make the OCS exploration and produc-
tion markets impenetrable.
40
A court, concluding that the leasing and production markets were
relatively open, next would examine whether the joint venture markets
were sufficiently concentrated that deconcentration would exert
procompetitive effects. 141 The court would analyze concentration data
relating to both OCS bidding and OCS production because competi-
tion in both is affected by joint venture activity. 142 The respondent
companies held a 41.2% share in the 1973 OCS bidding market and
controlled 62.3% of OCS production. These market share figures indi-
cated a moderate level of concentration. 43  Evidence establishing
downward pressure on prices as the number of competitors increased,
however, would support the contention that the market would benefit
from deconcentration.
The facts of In re Exxon indicate that the oil companies had insti-
exploration would be exceedingly high. 92 Stat. 646 (1978), 42 U.S.C. § 6213 (Supp. IV
1980) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 6213 (1976)). These price controls on crude oil were com-
pletely removed in 1981. Exec. Order No. 12,287, 3 C.F.R. 124 (1981 Compliation). Presi-
dent Reagan made the following statement regarding the cancellation of crude oil price
controls: "For more than 9 years, restrictive price controls have held U.S. oil production
below its potential, artificially boosted energy consumption, aggravated our balance of pay-
ments problems, and stifled technological breakthroughs. Price controls have also made us
more energy-dependent on the OPEC nations, a development that has jeopardized our eco-
nomic security and undermined price stability at home." Statement on Signing Exec. Order
No. 12,287, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 53 (Jan. 28, 1981).
140. Eight new firms participated in the 1973 bidding market. See note 112 supra.
The administrative law judge in Exxon similarly ruled in 1978 that the Department of
Energy's regulatory scheme was not sufficiently pervasive to prohibit application of the anti-
trust laws. Order Denying Respondents' Joint Motion to Strike All Claims and Issues and
to Quash Subpoena. Specifications Relating to Offshore Leasing at 4, fn re Exxon Corp.,
F.T.C. No. 8934 (order dated July 7, 1978). The pervasiveness of the regulatory scheme is
also a major factor in determining whether the activity under investigation is immune from
an antitrust attack based on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Immunity would be a
consequence of a government agency's statutory authorization of the regulation, a long his-
tory of active agency supervision, and continued congressional affirmation of the agency's
role. When all three elements are satisfied, direct agency regulation supplants the antitrust
laws. See Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659 (1975); Otter Tail Power Co.
v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, 409 U.S.
363 (1973). See notes 69-72 & accompanying text supra.
141. See notes 73-74 & accompanying text supra.
142. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 618-23. See note 118 & ac-
companying text supra.
143. See notes 115-18 & accompanying text supra.
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tuted a system of posted prices for crude oil.144 The FTC sought to
introduce evidence that posted prices were set at levels exceeding com-
petitive prices, and that respondents engaged in crude oil exchanges
145
to prevent price erosion.' 46 Such evidence would suggest that the mar-
ket was receptive to pressure from the presence of additional crude oil
supplies. Additional crude oil sellers would have added competitive
pressure. Based on this evidence, the court could have concluded that
the relevant OCS joint venture markets were concentrated and would
benefit from deconcentration.
The next step in the potential-competition analysis, as applied in
Marine Bancorporation, would be to consider whether alternative feasi-
ble means existed for gas company entry into the OCS crude market,
and whether such alternative methods would offer substantial likeli-
hood of deconcentrating offshore exploration and production
markets. 47
A determination of whether any of the joint venturing gas companies
profitably could have entered the crude markets de novo 148 would de-
pend on the expected return of such entry compared to that of other
investments available, the company's current liquidity, and the degree
of the company's experience in oil exploration and development. The
companies' subjective assessments regarding such entry would be irrel-
evant under a Marine Bancorporation analysis. "49 Evidence of natural
gas companies' actual participation in independent offshore drilling ac-
tivities would support a finding that they could have entered the off-
shore crude oil market de novo. 5 On the other hand, an analysis of
risks and costs might prove that they were incapable of more extensive
independent entry. The persuasiveness of this reasoning would depend
on a showing that the companies would not have entered the market
absent joint venture arrangements.
If a court determined that alternative feasible means for entry ex-
isted, it would next examine whether de novo entry by the gas compa-
nies would produce deconcentration in the OCS production market.
New entry into crude production, resulting in additional supplies of
crude oil, might undermine the posted price system. This weakening of
144. Posted prices are the prices at which respondents and other oil industry members
bought, sold, and exchanged crude oil. Complaint Counsel's First Statement, supra note
107, at 92.
145. A crude oil exchange between vertically integrated oil companies involves transfer-
ring crude oil from one company to another to avoid transportation expenses in shipping
crude oil from a company's wells to its refinery. Each exchange partner acquires an outlet
for its crude oil at the other's refinery. Id at 138, 144-45.
146. Id at 92-104. See note 112 supra.
147. See notes 62-63, 75-76 & accompanying text su.pra.
148. See notes 50, 62-64 & accompanying text supra.
149. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 632-39; United States v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. at 533-36, 563-66. See note 52 & accompanying text supra.
150. See note 108 & accompanying text supra.
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prices might, in turn, upset the noncompetitive market structure.' 5 1 Fi-
nally, the joint venture's commanding power could discourage market
entry by other potential competitors.152
It could be argued that the joint venture activity actually would
increase competition because of risk-spreading and cost-sharing. Off-
shore activity becomes more feasible if two companies are able to split
the expenses of the drilling projects. Sharing of expenses and risks
makes entry into offshore development more attractive and presents
fewer barriers to the individual joint venturer.
A court applying Marine Bancorporation standards to the In re Ex-
xon facts probably would conclude that the OCS joint ventures re-
duced future competition by removing from the market actual potential
entrants. The court would be likely to conclude that some of the joint
venturers were capable of independent entry, based on their initial
moves towards that goal and on their financial strength. The court also
might go on to find that the joint ventures resulted in higher barriers to
entry for those firms that were interested in entering the offshore mar-
ket, but were unable to participate in a joint venture arrangement.
Therefore, the court probably would dismiss the "risk-spreading" de-
fense as inapplicable to nonparticipants confronted by the command-
ing power of the joint ventures.
To determine whether the joint ventures had anticompetitive ef-
fects on present competition, the court next would evaluate whether the
participating gas companies were recognized by others in the OCS
crude markets as competitive threats prior to entering into joint venture
arrangements. As the oil market was sufficiently concentrated to bene-
fit from new competition, 53 the court would have to determine if any
of the joint venturing gas firms had the characteristics, capabilities, and
economic incentives to be considered perceived potential entrants.
54
Although the joint venturing gas companies have engaged in OCS
oil exploration and production, the facts indicate that the gas compa-
nies participated in the OCS market and the joint venture arrange-
ments to obtain natural gas, not crude oil. A court would be likely to
conclude from this evidence that there was no detrimental effect on
present competition by the joint venture on the crude oil product
market.
151. Complaint Counsel's First Statement, supra note 107, at 97-98, 107-08.
152. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. at 577. See also notes 38-41, 45 &
accompanying text supra.
153. See notes 73-74, 109-11, 115-17 & accompanying text supra.
154. See notes 58, 64 & accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 33
CONGLOMERATE JOINT VENTURES
Toward a More Meaningful Standard
The Supreme Court's analysis in potential-competition cases1
55 fo-
cuses on relatively few factors. The prevailing standard distinguishes
between the loss of an actual potential entrant and the loss of a per-
ceived potential entrant.156 Cases involving loss of future competition
require courts to predict the ability of actual potential entrants to enter
the market in a more procompetitive manner, thereby producing the
long-run effect of deconcentrating the relevant market. Cases involving
an unlawful diminution of present competition require an assessment
of the premerger influence of market entrants to determine whether a
procompetitive wings effect' 57 is lost by reason of the acquisition.
Joint Ventures and Mergers: The Need for Separate Standards
One criticism of the potential-competition analysis is that it fails to
formulate separate standards for determining the legality of joint ven-
tures and mergers.158 Differences between joint ventures' 59 and merg-
ers160 necessitate the formulation of separate standards. A merger
replaces two independent decisionmaking institutions with a single en-
tity.' 6' Unhampered merger activity can threaten the survival of small
businesses and cause reduction in consumer choice without corre-
155. In the main, the potential-competition analysis is applied to conglomerate acquisi-
tions because the standard was designed with conglomerate issues in mind, and because
Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), standards are considered inadequate in this area.
See notes 16-24 & accompanying text supra. The § 7 standard remains applicable in
preventing horizontal cartel behavior and vertical foreclosure resulting from conglomerate
acquisitions. See Brodley, The Legal Status of Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: A
Summary Assessment, 21 ANTITRUST BULL. 453, 471 (1976).
156. Some commentators have argued that the potential-competition doctrine only pro-
hibits mergers which lessen present competition. See, e.g., Kaplan, Potential Competition
andSection 7ofthe Clayton Act, 25 ANTITRUST BULL. 297,314-17 (1980); Rahl,Applcabili&y
of the Clayton Act to Potential Competition, 12 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST L. 128, 142-43
(1958); Comment, ToeholdAcquisitions & the Potential Competition Doctrine, 40 U. CHI. L.
Rv. 156, 180-82 (1972).
157. See note 34 & accompanying text supra.
158. Courts generally point out that joint ventures, unlike mergers, do not involve the
total absorption of another firm. Nevertheless, they continue to apply merger standards to
joint ventures. See, ag., Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981); SCM
Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968). But see Pitofsky, supra note 15, at 1025-26
(arguing that the essential issue in conglomerate joint venture and conglomerate merger
cases is the same: If entry into the product or geographic market by acquisition or joint
venture were not possible, would one of the parent companies be likely to enter by internal
expansion?).
159. See note 3 supra.
160. • See note 4 supra.
161. P. AREEDA, ANTrrRUST ANALYSIS 835-53 (3d ed. 1981).
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sponding increases in industry capacity, jobs, or output.162
A joint venture entity is a combination of less than all of the assets
of the parent companies. 163 A joint venture may occur as a simple con-
tractual arrangement, or it may occur in the form of a jointly owned
subsidiary corporation. 164 A joint venture generally is formed when
the parties acquire the stock or the assets of the new entity. A joint
venture is capable of producing new competition 65 because it may be
able to create economic efficiencies,166 overcome trade barriers, and de-
velop new technologies. As a joint venture allows the risks of operation
to be borne by two parties rather than one, entry into riskier markets
may be encouraged, especially when the potential return on investment
is high. Joint ventures also may allow entry into markets when high
capital start-up costs would have prohibited either company from en-
tering alone. Joint ventures enable firms to pool their individual re-
search and further technological development. 67 As a joint venture
may be dissolved after its purpose is accomplished, and as it does not
permanently absorb another market participant, it generally is re-
garded as potentially less harmful to competition than mergers.
168
In November 1980, the Department of Justice released an antitrust
guide relating to research joint ventures. 169 The Department endorsed
the position that research joint ventures should be judged by standards
that focus on their unique characteristics:
Analysis of joint research should not, however, be equated with that
of mergers and acquisitions. Market structure is a primary factor in
determining the legality of mergers and acquisitions. Structure is no
more than the starting point in assessing the effect of joint research
on competition. . . because joint research. . . does not necessarily
162. See V P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1 1111-1115 (1980); see also
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323-34 (1962) (discussing the probable effect
of a merger). But see R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 206 (1978). See generally P.
STEINER, MERGERS 55-58, 69-74 (1975) (summarizing the anticompetitive consequences that
may result from a conglomerate merger).
163. See note 3 supra.
164. Jackson, Application of U.S. Antitrust Law to International Investment: Joint Ven-
tures, Mergers and Acquisitions, 5 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 142, 156 (1980).
165. This occurs, for example, when a typewriter manufacturing company and a com-
puter firm agree to form a joint venture for the limited purpose of producing word process-
ing machines.
166. That is, the combined resources of two parent firms may enable the joint venture to
operate at levels that decrease the manufacturing costs of producing the product.
167. See generally Mead, The Competitive Signfftcance of Joint Ventures, 12 ANTITRUST
BULL. 819, 823-25 (1967).
168. See Comment, The Corporate Joint Venture Under the Antitrust Laws, 37 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 712, 717 (1962).
169. Department of Justice, Antitrust Guide Concerning Research Joint Ventures [July-
Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 992, Special Supplement (Dec. 4, 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Research Joint Ventures].
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eliminate additional independent research by the parties. 170
The guide reflects the philosophy that there are significant distinctions
between joint ventures and mergers necessitating formulation of a sep-
arate standard for judging the legality of research joint ventures.
The guide favors joint ventures that promote competition through
the development of new technology171 and recommends that the legal-
ity of a research joint venture be questioned only when the agreement
contains collateral restraints not reasonably related to the lawful pur-
poses of the venture.1 72
Joint ventures do, however, have the potential to precipitate an-
ticompetitive action. The participants in the joint venture might agree
to fix prices or to divide up the market to avoid competition. Further-
more, the combined financial power of the joint venturers in a market
with high capital requirements is likely to place competitors at a disad-
vantage and restrain entry by new firms, thereby lessening the likeli-
hood of future competition.1 73
The guide suggests that a joint venture be reviewed against the
backdrop of other business dealings between the parties to determine
whether a network of joint activity with anticompetitive effects ex-
ists. ' 4 The study concludes that research joint ventures that increase
barriers to entry through the development of new technology should be
discouraged.
175
The test for judging the legality of a joint venture should consider
evidence of the venture's scope, duration, and purpose. The combina-
tion of companies engaged in a joint venture for a limited purpose may
affect competition to a lesser degree than would a merger. That a joint
venture agreement is of limited duration may also mitigate any short-
term anticompetitive consequences. The Supreme Court initially ex-
pressed approval of these distinctions in Penn-Olin,176 but subsequent
170. Id at 3.
171. Id at 2.
172. Id at 5-7.
173. 1979 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), No. 916, at A-24 (May 31, 1979)
(May 24, 1979 speech by Daniel C. Schwarz, Deputy Director of the FTC Bureau of Compe-
tition); see S. RUTTENBERG, THE AMERICAN OIL INDUSTRY 41-45 (1973); Bernstein, Joint
Ventures in the Light of Recent Antitrust Developments: Anti-Competitive Joint Ventures, 10
ANTITRUST BULL. 25, 27-29 (1965); see also Comment, The Corporate Joint Venture Under
theAntitrust Laws, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 712, 734 (1962): "mhe competitive sword of the joint
venture is double-edged. Just as it vitalizes.it can depress; just as it opens it can congest. If
the restrictive effects are to be prevented, and yet the constructive aspects encouraged, then
the permissible bounds of corporate collaboration must be clearly defined."
174. Research Joint Ventures, supra note 169, at 5.
175. Id at 7. In such a case, the venture might create new technologies so desirable that
other competitors would be unable to compete until they made similar investments.
176. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. at 170, 177. See text accompany-
ing note 32 supra.
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decisions suggest that only minimal significance is given to the more
limited nature of joint ventures as compared to mergers.
177
Frequently, courts have had difficulty with contradictory economic
data in potential-competition cases. 178 Responding to these problems,
the federal courts increasingly have based their decisions on concentra-
tion statistics. 179 Concentration levels under the facts of In re Exxon
could be fairly described as moderate. They might still have been high
enough to trigger application of the potential-competition doctrine. Al-
though these rules give clear notice of the boundaries of permissible
behavior to interested parties, decisions relying on presumptive market
share rules fail to analyze the possible procompetitive effects and other
socially desirable features of the challenged agreement.180
Current judicial thinking in merger and acquisition law favors
deconcentration at the expense of most other goals, including effi-
ciency.'I An acquisition resulting in higher concentration levels might
be prohibited despite corresponding economies of scale achieved by the
acquisition.8 2 The Supreme Court should reconsider the wisdom of
this policy. A new standard should reflect the fact that high concentra-
tion ratios alone are not determinative of anticompetitive
consequences. 183
The quest for efficient production is at the heart of our competitive
system and should be considered by the courts in antitrust cases. The
ability of manufacturers to achieve superior efficiency in obtaining re-
sources, developing engineering and production skills, and improving
managerial organization may determine their survival in the transna-
tional markets of the 1980's. The joint ventures that prompted the In re
Exxon challenge resulted in increased OCS production and greater en-
177. See, e.g., Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981).
178. See note 81 supra.
179. See, e.g., Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971, 979 (1981); Mercantile Texas
Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 638 F.2d 1255, 1266-67 (1981). For
an endorsement of presumptive rules, see P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 885 (3d ed.
1981); Bok, Section Seven of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
HARv. L. REv. 226, 298-99 (1960); Brodley, supra note 15; Pitofsky, supra note 15; Turner,
supra note 4.
180. For critical analyses of presumptive rules, see R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX
198-216 (1978); Bock, The Relativity of Economic Evidence in Merger Cases-Emerging Deci-
sions Force the Issue, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1355 (1965); Hood, Potential Competition, 21
ANTITRUST BULL. 485, 502 (1976); Robinson, Antitrust Developments 1973, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 163, 188-90 (1974). Congress appeared to recognize the drawbacks of presumptive
rules when drafting § 7. H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949).
181. See text accompanying note 80 supra. See also Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. RES. 381 (1980).
182. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. at 580.
183. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 205-06 (1978). See generally Dewey, The




ergy self-sufficiency. These factors, however, would not have been con-
sidered relevant by a court applying the Marine Bancorporation
potential-competition analysis to the Zn re Exxon joint ventures. Addi-
tionally, the current formulation of the potential-competition doctrine
places no value on the creation of new technology. Such an omission
may inhibit technological breakthroughs and result in unnecessary con-
tinued dependence on foreign oil.184 The Marine Bancorporation stan-
dard should be modified to take into account these factors in joint
venture cases.
A New Standard
A restructured potential-competition analysis should begin, as it
presently does, with a showing of high market concentration. The his-
tory of section 7 reveals congressional and judicial commitment to
"smallness and decentralization as ways of discouraging the concentra-
tion of discretionary authority." 18 5 A defendant, however, should not
be denied the opportunity to counter concentration statistics with evi-
dence that the joint venture overcomes high risks and costs that would
have discouraged the companies from entering the market indepen-
dently, improves the position of the United States in the international
market, promotes technological development, or preserves competition.
The starting point of the potential-competition test for joint ven-
tures should be a determination of whether the concentration ratios es-
tablish prima facie violations of section 7. Professor Brodley has
proposed the following numerical formula in merger cases:
A market extension acquisition would be presumptively unlawful
where (A) the acquiring firm is either (1) one of the two largest out-
of-the-market firms with market share of at least ten percent and an-
nual sales or assets of at least $100 million in a closely proximate
geographic market, or (2) one of the 200 largest industrial corpora-
tions (or comparably sized other firm) with significant sales in the
proximate market, (B) the target market is highly concentrated, and
(C)the target firm has a market share of at least five percent.186
These figures also could be applied in joint venture cases, as long
as defendants are afforded an opportunity to offer the following de-
fenses. First, the joint venturers should be permitted to show that they
were discouraged from entering the market independently because of
exceptionally high costs and risks involved in the undertaking. They
184. This concern for efficiency is not a new theme. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
386 U.S. at 588, 597 (Harlan, J., concurring); Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antift/st, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 363, 368-74 (1965); Pitofsky, supra note 15, at 1008; Turner, supra note 4, at
1317, 1354.
185. Dewey, The New Learning: One Man's View, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION:
THE NEW LEARNING 13 (1974).
186. Brodley, supra note 15, at 83.
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should be allowed to show that a sharing of the investment burden ac-
tually encourages more firms to engage in the activity. In this way, a
joint venture may inspire competition by reducing barriers to entry,
despite the possible removal of a potential entrant.
Second, joint venturers should be permitted to defend by showing
that the joint venture activity enables the companies to compete effec-
tively with foreign competitors in the domestic market, or substantially
alleviates domestic market dependence on foreign resources or goods.
An additional requirement of this defense is that there be a reasonable
limitation on the time and scope of the potential market power likely to
be created by the joint venture. 187 American markets are presently vul-
nerable to disruption by strong foreign competitors and foreign re-
source cartels. The rationale for this defense is that it enables
American manufacturers to compete more effectively in transnational
markets, and that it protects the American economy during resource
embargos.
A third defense should be that it is not economically feasible for
any of the joint venturers to engage individually in research and to
produce goods in an industry that is hampered by outdated technol-
ogy. 188 The proposed policy would encourage efforts to modernize in-
dustries that currently perform poorly because of their reliance on
outmoded, inefficient technology.
The final defense should be that the joint venture activity leaves
competition unchanged in the relevant markets or will increase market
competition at a future identifiable time. This defense allows acquisi-
tions having present anticompetitive effects to avoid section 7 chal-
lenges if long-term competitive benefits will be gained.
These defenses extend beyond areas traditionally considered by
the courts in potential-competition cases. Assuming that their market
shares would have constituted a prima facie violation in In re Exxon,
the defendants could have argued that the high costs and risks involved
in the undertaking discouraged the natural gas companies from enter-
ing the market independently, that new technology in deep sea drilling
was anticipated to result from the venture, and that joint activity would
lead to decreased American dependence on foreign oil. Inclusion of
these defenses in an analysis of a case such as In re Exxon might well
lead to the conclusion that the joint ventures should be permitted.
This proposed standard for determining the legality of joint ven-
tures accommodates several factors originally set forth by the Supreme
Court in Penn-Olin, but neglected in other cases. The twelve criteria
set forth in Penn-Olin gave courts latitude in analyzing the range of
187. For further discussion, see Research Joint Ventures, supra note 169, at 11-12.
188. See id at 13-14.
[Vol. 33
CONGLOMERATE JOINT VENTURES
considerations generally present in joint venture cases. 189 The prevail-
ing standard after Marine Bancorporation lacks this comprehensive
perspective, particularly in assessing the legality of a joint venture.
Courts should take into account the setting in which the joint venture
was created, as well as the reasons for its existence. 190 Additionally, as
noted above, courts should consider the joint venture's limited scope,
duration, and purpose. Generally, the greater the limitations, the less
willing the court should be to find a violation.
The new formula, in some respects, would signify a philosophical
rejection of the ideal described by Judge Learned Hand.191 A society
of small competitors may be costly in terms of efficiency and national
economic strength, and should no longer be preserved "for its own
sake."'192 The beneficial effects of joint ventures on economic effi-
ciency, particularly in risky, capital-intensive industries, such as the oil
industry, may outweigh the possible anticompetitive effects of increased
market concentration.
Conclusion
FromPenn-Olin to Marine Bancorporation, the Supreme Court has
attempted to fashion a standard for evaluating the legality of joint ven-
tures and mergers by identifying and proscribing activities tending to
concentrate a given market. In cases following Penn-Olin, the Court
has simplified the test to make its application more comprehensible,
flexible, and straightforward. The result is a set of rules too narrow to
embrace the unique problems presented by joint ventures in capital-
intensive, high-risk markets such as the offshore crude oil exploration
and production industries. A new standard should be formulated that
distinguishes between mergers and joint ventures. The test for evaluat-
ing the legality of the challenged joint venture should be capable of
identifying those features of a joint venture arrangement promoting ef-
ficiency and not posing a serious threat of increasing concentration in a
market within the meaning of section 7.
The proposed potential-competition analysis would include de-
fenses for those activities with exceptionally high risks and costs, im-
proving the competitive position of American manufacturers in
international markets, or involving industries handicapped by outmo-
ded technology. Such a standard fulfills the congressional objectives in
drafting and amending section 7 and treats more equitably industries
189. See note 35 & accompanying text supra.
190. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. at 177.
191. See note 18 supra.
192. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
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using joint venture acquisitions to overcome these exceptional market
problems.
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